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Raising the tone? The impact of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ campaigning on 
voting in the 2007 Scottish Parliament election  
 
 
Charles Pattie (University of Sheffield), David Denver (Lancaster University), 
Robert Johns and James Mitchell (University of Strathclyde) 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Most research on campaign effects in British elections has focussed on exposure to the 
campaign. Far less attention has been given to how the campaign is perceived, although 
American research on the effects of negative campaigning suggests that this is a potentially 
important area. The article investigates the extent to which vote choices in the 2007 Scottish 
Parliament election were affected by perceptions of the parties’ campaigns as ‘positive’ or 
‘negative’. Partisanship and increased exposure to a party’s campaign increased individuals’ 
chances of rating a campaign positively. Other things being equal, however, campaigns 
which come to be seen in a negative light backfire on the party responsible, reducing the 
propensity of people to vote for it. 
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Raising the tone? The impact of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ campaigning on 
voting in the 2007 Scottish Parliament election  
  
 
The importance of local campaigning in British elections is now well-established. In general, 
the more effort parties put into their constituency election campaigns the better they do (see, 
for example, Denver and Hands, 1997; Denver et al, 2004; Pattie et al., 1995; Pattie and 
Johnston, 2003).  There is still more to learn, however.  One lacuna in the UK campaign 
effects literature to date has been its almost complete silence on the issue of campaign tone.  
In contrast, there is considerable debate in the North American literature (and more widely 
among political commentators) on whether and how ‘negative’, as opposed to ‘positive’, 
political advertising affects voters.  Some argue that negative advertising has a demobilising 
effect, such that electors exposed to it become less likely to vote in future (Ansolabehere et 
al., 1994; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995).  Others claim, on the contrary, that negative 
advertising either has no net effect on voters, or may actually encourage participation 
(Freedman and Goldstein, 1999; Goldstein and Freedman, 2002; Lau and Pomper, 2004; 
Sigelman and Kugler, 2003).  
 
Much has been written on the content of political messages in the UK (see, for example, 
Scammell, 1995; Kavanagh, 1995; Rosenbaum, 1997; Norris et al., 1999; van Heerde, 2007) 
but, apart from work by Sanders and Norris (2005), there has been no serious attempt to 
analyse the impact of the tone of campaign messages on British voters.  It is unclear, 
therefore, whether American concerns about the impact of negative campaigning are 
transferable to other polities.  In this article, we provide an analysis of campaign tone in the 
UK context by analysing data from a survey of voters at the 2007 Scottish Parliament 
election.  As discussed below, the campaigns of the major parties were perceived as varying 
sharply in tone, providing us with favourable circumstances in which to analyse the relative 
effects of negative and positive campaigning in the UK. 
 
Understanding campaign tone 
Probably as a consequence of the fact that the United States has relatively open and 
unregulated environment for political advertising, most of the existing research on campaign 
tone has been on US elections.  First amendment rights allow candidates to buy substantial 
amounts of (especially television) advertising and to use it to put forward whatever message 
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they wish.  While many campaign messages are positive, publicising the candidate’s own 
record and policy stances, there is a long-standing tradition of negative advertising, attacking 
opponents fairly or unfairly (Jamieson, 1992). Famous examples of the genre include Lyndon 
Johnson’s ‘daisy’ advert from the 1964 Presidential campaign, which subliminally suggested 
that his Republican rival, Barry Goldwater, would provoke a nuclear war, and 1988’s ‘Willie 
Horton’ and ‘revolving door’ adverts, which the Bush Sr. campaign used to suggest that 
Democrat candidate, Michael Dukakis, was soft on crime (and, some argue, to make coded 
reference to white American fears over race).  In American elections, negative campaigning 
is more frequently indulged in by challengers than by incumbents, by Republicans than by 
Democrats, by those with limited campaign resources than by those with well-funded 
campaigns, by candidates in open seat contests and by those who are themselves the targets 
of negative campaigns (Lau and Pomper, 2001a, 2004).  In other words, ‘going negative’ is a 
strategy of the political underdog (who may hope that a negative campaign will resonate 
more with voters – or just be noticed more by them - than a positive one) and of challengers 
(who are less likely to have a positive record in office to defend).  Furthermore, the tendency 
for those attacked to go negative themselves reflects the widely held belief among political 
campaigners that the worst response to an attack is to fail to respond: as Lau and Pomper 
(2001a, 2004) put it, negative campaigning can result in a nuclear mutually assured 
destruction strategy. 
 
Despite the long tradition of negative campaigning in US politics, it is only in the last decade 
or so that analysis of its impact has moved from the anecdotal to the evidential.  What has 
since become a major research area was kick-started by some ingenious experimental 
research which randomly assigned participants to different treatment groups, some of which 
were shown negative campaign material, some positive, and some a mixture of both.  
Negative advertising seemed to demobilise participants: those exposed to such messages 
became more cynical about politics, felt less efficacious and became less inclined to vote than 
was the case for those seeing more positive messages (Ansolabehere et al., 1994; 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995). Speaking as it did to anxieties about political participation, 
disengagement and growing distrust of politicians, this research caught a mood.  Increasingly, 
however, the original ‘demobilisation’ argument has been challenged by subsequent research. 
It has been suggested that, far from putting people off politics, negative advertising can 
actually encourage participation by reminding voters why they want to ensure that a 
particular candidate or party is kept out of office (Freedman and Goldstein, 1999; Lau and 
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Pomper, 2001b; Goldstein and Freedman, 2002).  Others have rejected claims that negative 
campaigning increases distrust of politicians and reduces people’s sense of political efficacy. 
On the contrary, the public seem relatively robust in their ability to withstand and discount 
negative campaign messages (Brooks, 2006; Brooks and Geer, 2007; Jackson et al., 2009).  
Overall, Lau and Pomper’s (2004) summary of the then-existing literature concluded that 
there was little real evidence for demobilization. 
 
More detailed analyses suggest that the impact of exposure to negative campaigning varies 
according to the characteristics of individuals – especially their level of political involvement. 
Sigelman and Kugler (2003), for instance, find that partisanship strongly influences voters’ 
perceptions of the same campaign as positive, negative or neutral, as does level of political 
knowledge (those with more knowledge being more likely to perceive campaigns as negative).  
Partisans as a whole are less likely than non-partisans to perceive campaigns as negative, in 
part reflecting the tendency of the former to be more attentive to messages from ‘their’ party 
or candidate than to those from rivals (Iyengar et al., 2008).  In general, partisans tend to 
perceive attacks on their party by opponents as unfair and illegitimate but when such attacks 
hit home they seem to have an impact: partisans who see attacks on their party as fair are less 
likely to vote than are those who shrug them off (Stevens et al., 2008).  Furthermore, negative 
campaigning is less likely to influence feelings of efficacy or attitudes towards parties among 
more politically sophisticated voters than among the less well-informed. (Stevens, 2008). 
 
Although there are systematic variations in voters’ perceptions both of the negativity and of 
the fairness of campaigns, such perceptions of campaign tone are not completely shaped by 
partisanship.  Ridout and Franz (2008) compare voters’ perceptions of campaign tone against 
different ‘objective’ measures of campaign negativity based on campaign broadcasts, media 
reports and so on. They find that, however campaign tone is measured, voters’ perceptions of 
whether a campaign was negative or positive correlate well with ‘expert’ assessments. The 
public, in short, is generally good at picking up on the overall tone of a campaign. 
Partisanship and political knowledge may affect how they process and use those perceptions, 
but they do not seem to affect the perceptions themselves. 
 
The key work on campaign tone in the UK is by Sanders and Norris (1998, 2005; Norris et al., 
1999) who adapt the experimental approach of Ansolabehere and Iyengar.  Overall, their 
results suggest that television campaign messages have little impact on British voters.  
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However, as they acknowledge, while the impact of a one-off exposure to a particular 
campaign message in the context of an experiment may be small, the cumulative impact of 
repeat messages in the context of an actual campaign might be larger. 
 
Much of the research to date on this topic has focussed on the impact of negative political 
advertising on turnout and participation and thus sheds no light on other possible effects.  
Even if negative campaigning does not change decisions on whether or not to vote, it may 
still influence party choices.  Negative campaigning (or the perception that a campaign is 
negative) may persuade people not to vote for the party being targeted but to opt for another 
party (the course of action hoped for by the party running the campaign).  This has the 
potential to backfire, however.  To the extent that negative campaigning is either adjudged 
unfair or seen as an indicator of an overly-aggressive approach to politics, it might also 
damage the standing of the campaigning party.   Analyses of US Senate elections suggest that 
negative campaigns have few beneficial effects on party support. Challengers may receive a 
slight boost by going negative if they have few campaign resources but incumbents who go 
negative tend to lose votes (Lau and Pomper, 2002, 2004).  
 
In the remainder of the article, we investigate the impact of campaign tone on vote choice in 
the context of the 2007 Scottish Parliament election. We begin, however, with a short 
discussion of the campaign context. 
 
The Scottish Parliament Election 2007: the campaign context 
Table 1 shows the results of the 2007 Scottish Parliament election1 which produced Labour’s 
worst performance in Scotland since 1955.  Having dominated Scottish politics for half a 
century, Labour was narrowly beaten into second place by the SNP, which in turn obtained 
its best ever result (Denver, 2007; Johns et al., 2009a).  Labour’s defeat was widely 
anticipated.  The Scottish party was adversely affected by the unpopularity of the UK Labour 
government but adverse public evaluations of the Labour-led Scottish Executive’s 
performance in the preceding Parliament also did substantial damage (Johns et al., 2009a, 
2009b).  The SNP, meanwhile, having re-elected Alex Salmond as party leader in 2004, was 
riding high.  From late 2006 through to March 2007 the SNP led Labour fairly consistently in 
voting intentions for Holyrood.   
 
Table 1 about here 
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The very different pressures facing Labour and the SNP were reflected in the parties’ 
campaigns (Jones, 2007; Johns et al., 2009a).  Labour’s campaign played on fears that an 
SNP win would be the first step towards independence, with particular emphasis on the 
alleged adverse effects on Scotland’s economy.  The party’s campaign was not all negative: 
for instance, Jack McConnell, Labour leader and First Minister in the outgoing administration, 
launched the party’s manifesto with a major commitment to investment in education. 
Arguably, however, negative messages about the SNP outweighed the positive in Labour’s 
campaign, at least in terms of the amount of coverage that they received. 
 
The SNP, on the other hand, was able to campaign on the promise of a fresh start after the 
Labour years: ‘time for a change’ was undoubtedly part of its appeal.  Ironically, as Jones 
(2007) points out, the message of change was accompanied by some of the tactics employed 
by New Labour in 1997, such as reaching out to traditionally hostile groups like business and 
middle-class voters.  Strategically, the SNP approach was influenced by the work of political 
psychologist Martin Seligman (1998) who argued that elections tend to be won by parties 
projecting positive messages. The party tried to counter fears over imminent independence 
(which it was important to do as a majority of Scottish voters remains opposed to 
independence) by proposing a referendum prior to any action.  Moreover, in order to project a 
more positive image Alex Salmond adopted a measured, statesman-like tone and played 
down his normally combative personality. 
 
In this election, then, it was the incumbent party – Labour – which fought the more negative 
campaign and the challenger – the SNP – which accentuated the positive.  This is the reverse 
of the normal pattern in the US and reflects Labour’s perceived status as the underdog going 
into the election and the party’s difficulties in making a positive case out of its record in 
office.  In effect, important parts of the party’s campaign boiled down to Hilaire Belloc’s 
famous advice for middle-class Edwardian children: ‘always keep a-hold of Nurse, for fear of 
finding something worse’. 
 
Given their dominance of Scottish politics, the Labour and SNP campaigns inevitably 
received most media attention. The other two major parties, the Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives (and, a fortiori, the minor parties in Scottish politics) struggled to make 
themselves heard.  For the Liberal Democrats, the campaign challenge was to present 
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themselves as an effective party of government (as they had been a part of the ruling coalition 
since devolution and could point to some achievements in office) while at the same time 
keeping some distance from Labour, their unpopular partner in the Executive.  Clearly, this 
was a difficult tightrope to walk.  The Conservatives, meanwhile, had relatively little to lose 
(having been previously squeezed to the margins of Scottish politics) and much to gain.  In a 
change from their strategy in previous Scottish elections, they downplayed talk of nationalist 
threats to the Union and focussed instead on the failings of the Scottish Executive, hoping to 
establish themselves as a more significant opposition force in the Scottish Parliament. 
 
The 2007 Scottish election campaign thus provides a relatively clear case of a largely 
negative campaign run by Labour, a largely positive one run by the SNP and more mixed 
messages coming from the other parties.  In the following sections, we look at how the 
campaigns were perceived and the influence of these perceptions on voting.  First, however, 
we briefly describe our data. 
 
Measuring campaign tone in Scotland 2007 
The analyses reported here are based on data from an internet panel survey of Scottish voters 
conducted by YouGov on behalf of the Scottish Election Study (SES) 2007.  We draw on the 
first two survey waves, the first of which took place about a fortnight before polling day on 3 
May 2007 (1872 respondents) while the second was immediately after polling day (1552 
respondents). 2  
 
For our purposes, the SES has clear advantages over face-to-face cross-sectional surveys. 
First, as with recent British Election Study surveys, the pre-post panel design is well-suited to 
the investigation of short-term campaign effects. Post-election cross-section surveys risk 
serious endogeneity problems in analysis, since explanatory variables are measured at the 
same time as dependent variables. If measured post-election, variables that could explain vote 
choice might themselves be affected by the result of the election, rendering their use as 
predictors of vote problematic. A pre-post panel, on the other hand, allows potential 
explanatory variables to be measured before the election, hence minimising endogeneity 
problems, and also permits a focus on change in vote across the course of a campaign. 
 
Secondly, internet surveys have the considerable advantage of speed.  Each wave of the SES 
took only a few days to complete.  The views of respondents are unlikely, therefore, to have 
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been affected by events occurring between the start and the end of fieldwork.  By contrast, 
large face-to-face surveys can be in the field for several weeks, increasing the risk that 
estimates of key variables may be affected by (for instance) changes in the post-election 
political landscape which have little or nothing to do with the election itself.3 
 
In what follows we are primarily interested in responses to three sets of questions.  The first 
relates to vote.  In the pre-election wave, respondents were asked to indicate their voting 
intentions for both the regional and the constituency ballots; in the post-election wave, they 
were asked how they had actually voted in each ballot.  Using these data, we can examine 
shifts in party supported across the campaign.  The second set of questions, asked in the post-
election wave, captures exposure to the parties’ campaigns.  Respondents were asked whether 
they had been canvassed, leafleted or telephoned during the campaign and by which party, 
and also which parties’ televised party election broadcasts they had seen. The third set of 
questions asked second-wave respondents to assess how positive or negative, on the whole, 
they thought each party’s campaign had been.4 
 
Public perceptions of campaign tone 
We consider first perceptions of campaign tone. Overall, public perceptions of which parties 
ran negative and which positive campaigns accord well with expectations (Table 2).  The 
balance of opinion among respondents was that Labour’s campaign was the most negative of 
all the major parties -  almost 60 per cent of those expressing a view thought that the 
campaign was negative, a far larger proportion than for any other party’s campaign.  On the 
other hand, the SNP’s decision to avoid negative campaigning appears to have been noticed 
by the public, 51 per cent of whom believed that the party’s campaign had been positive.  
Although clear majorities viewed Labour’s campaign as negative and the SNP’s as positive, 
significant minorities had other views.  Almost one in five respondents thought that the 
Labour campaign was positive, for instance, and a further one in five that it was balanced.  
Similarly, nearly a third of respondents saw the SNP’s campaign as mainly negative.  Clearly, 
perceptions of Labour and SNP campaign tone varied a good deal. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Opinions on the Liberal Democrat and Conservative campaigns were more mixed. The 
Conservative campaign elicited the most diverse opinions, with roughly a third of 
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respondents thinking it was positive, a third rating it as negative and a third seeing it in a 
broadly neutral light. The Liberal Democrat campaign evoked the most equivocal responses: 
more than 40 per cent of respondents rated it neither positive nor negative, considerably more 
than for any other party’s campaign. It is difficult to know whether this means that people 
really thought that the Liberal Democrats’ efforts were balanced or that they simply had no 
terribly strong impression of what the party’s campaign was about. Most of those giving 
other responses on the Liberal Democrat campaign came down on the positive side. 
 
We can measure the extent to which individuals’ evaluations of the different parties’ 
campaigns diverged or paralleled one another by correlating the ratings given to each party.  
As Table 3 shows, in most cases there is a modest correspondence of views.  Thus, on 
average, the more negative someone thought the Labour campaign had been, the more 
negative he or she thought the Liberal Democrat campaign had been.  Similar weakly positive 
relationships are found between assessments of the campaigns of the Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats, and that of the SNP with both of the latter. On the other hand, there is no 
significant relationship between evaluations of the Conservative and Labour campaigns, 
while judgements regarding Labour’s campaign were negatively related to perceptions of the 
SNP campaign. Overall, those who believed that Labour fought a negative battle saw the SNP 
campaign as positive, and vice-versa. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
To explore the factors that underlie the various responses to the parties’ campaigns, we 
employ regression models with evaluations of campaign tone as the dependent variables. 
Predictor variables include a range of demographic and political factors.   We might expect 
education levels to have some bearing on evaluations in that those with more formal 
educational qualifications may be more judgemental than those with fewer qualifications. 
Age may also play a part, although it is difficult to predict whether older voters will be more 
or less cynical than their younger counterparts. In addition, we control for respondents’ social 
class. 
 
Turning to the political variables, previous research and common sense suggest that how 
voters assess a party’s campaign will depend to some extent on whether or not they already 
support it and so we include party identification, as declared in the pre-election wave of the 
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survey.  Since some research suggest that perceptions of campaign negativity increase with 
political knowledge (Sigelman and Kugler , 2003) we also include a measure of the latter  - 
the number of correct responses (out of four) given to a short political quiz administered in 
the pre-election survey wave. 5  In addition, we might expect that individuals’ perceptions of 
whether a party’s campaign was positive or negative would be influenced by how heavily 
they had been exposed to the campaign. On the basis of the questions previously discussed 
we constructed a rough and ready index of exposure to each party’s campaign by summing 
the number of different types of exposure reported.  Finally, we include a variable measuring 
how likeable respondents thought each party was before the election took place.  Respondents 
were asked to indicate this using an 11-point scale with low scores indicating strong dislike 
and high a strong liking. The variable is used here to capture general feelings towards each 
party over and above those associated with partisanship, in the expectation that the more 
favourably people feel towards a party in the opening stages of a campaign, the more likely 
they will be after the election to believe that the party campaigned positively. 
 
The full details of the analyses are given in the appendix (Table A1) but Table 4 shows which 
variables made a significant impact on perceptions of campaign tone.  In this table, ‘P’ and 
‘N’ indicate that the variable had a significant impact on respondents’ seeing a campaign 
more positively or more negatively, other things being equal, than the comparator group. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
It is striking that, apart from perceptions of Labour’s campaign, socio-demographic variables 
had very little impact. Older respondents were more likely to think the Conservative 
campaign was negative but otherwise education, age and class did not affect perceptions of 
the Conservative, Liberal Democrat and SNP campaigns. In Labour’s case, those with 
qualifications had a more negative view than those without, all age groups tended to have a 
more positive perception than the youngest and the petty bourgeoisie and foremen had (even) 
more negative impressions than the salariat.  
 
The political variables, on the other hand, had more impact on perceptions of campaign tone. 
In line with previous research, those with greater political knowledge tended to view the 
Labour campaign as being more negative but they were significantly less likely to think that 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats ran negative campaigns.  Arguably, it is the actual 
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content of campaigns which determines whether the knowledgeable view them as positive or 
negative.  The good news – for most parties – is that the more respondents remembered 
encountering their campaigns, the more positive they thought the campaigns were. This good 
news does not extend to Labour, however, since exposure to the Labour campaign had no 
impact on judgments regarding how positive or negative it was. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the party likeability measures have a strong and consistent effect on 
campaign evaluations.  The more individuals liked a party at the outset of the election, other 
things being equal, the more likely they were to say, after the election, that the party had 
fought a positive campaign.  Liking or disliking parties is closely related to party 
identification but it is possible to feel warmly disposed to a party without being a partisan.  
Even taking party likeability into account, however, party identification continues to have 
some impact.  Labour identifiers had a negative view of the Conservative campaign as did 
SNP supporters of the Labour campaign.  SNP and Liberal Democrat identifiers thought their 
own parties’ campaigns were positive and the latter took the same view of the SNP campaign.  
The only oddity in the party identification results is that, having taken account of the other 
variables, Conservatives tended to think that Labour’s campaign was positive.  This may 
reflect the fact that both parties shared hostility towards the SNP and its policy of Scottish 
independence on their part. 
 
The impact of campaign tone 
In this section, we examine whether assessments of campaign tone appear to affect party 
choice. We begin by looking once again at how much people liked the various parties. As the 
same question was also asked in the post-election wave of the SES, we can investigate 
whether people came to like a party less (or more) over the course of the election if they 
thought it had fought a negative (or positive) campaign.  
 
Table 5 presents the results of four regression analyses predicting each party’s post-election 
likeability score. In each equation we control for the relevant pre-election likeability score 
and, entirely as expected, all these coefficients are positive and significant.  In other words, 
the more someone liked a party before the election, the more they liked it after. 
 
Table 5 about here 
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Our main interest, however, is in the measures of perceived campaign tone.  Campaign 
perceptions for all four parties are included in each equation.  This enables us to ascertain not 
only whether those who believed that a party ran a positive campaign might feel better 
disposed towards it after the election than before, but also to assess whether negative 
campaigns by rival parties might also have an impact on likeability.   Negative campaigns 
may damage the party that they are aimed at or else backfire, leading to sympathy for the 
target and calumny for the perpetrator. 
 
The results support the latter conjecture. In each equation, the coefficient for the relevant 
party’s campaign tone is significant and negative.  This means that the more negative a 
party’s campaign was perceived to be, the less likeable the party became over the course of 
the election.  Other parties’ campaigns also had some effect, however.  Campaigns perceived 
to be negative can damage the campaigning party by making rival parties more likeable.  The 
more negative people thought the Labour and SNP campaigns to have been, for instance, the 
more they came to like the Conservatives.  Similarly, the more negative people thought the 
Conservatives had been the more their opinion of the other parties improved during the 
campaign.  Those who thought that Labour had campaigned negatively came to like the SNP 
more and those who thought the SNP had been negative ended up more favourably disposed 
towards the Liberal Democrats.  Overall, negative campaigns appear to have won few friends. 
 
Turning to vote choices, we have seen that partisanship is an important correlate of attitudes 
towards campaigns: people think better of campaigns fought by parties they generally support 
than of the campaigns of other parties.  It may be, therefore, that any apparent impact of 
campaign tone on vote choice simply reflects underlying partisanship.  To test whether 
perceptions of campaign tone have an independent effect on vote choice, therefore, we need 
to control for pre-existing partisanship and we do so in a series of binary logistic regression 
models.  Each contrasts those who cast their regional vote for a party (coded 1) with those 
who did not (either voting for another party or abstaining, coded 0). Pre-election party 
identification is the main control variable but we also control for exposure to each party’s 
campaign.  As before, full details are in the Appendix (Table A2) and we provide here a 
summary of the effects of significant variables (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 about here 
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As is standard in analyses of party choice, those who identified with a party were more likely 
to vote for it and those who identified with another party or none were generally less likely to 
do so.  In addition, other things being equal, greater exposure to the Conservative and SNP 
campaigns is associated with an increased likelihood of voting for these parties while the 
more people saw of the SNP campaign, the less likely they were to vote Labour.  Intriguingly, 
however, neither the Labour nor the Liberal Democrat campaign seems to have gained further 
support, although the more someone saw of the Liberal Democrat campaign, the more likely 
he or she was to vote Labour.   Our main interest here, however, is in perceptions of 
campaign tone and the regression results suggest that perceptions of how a party campaigned 
can influence vote choice, even controlling for prior party leanings.  In every case, the more 
positive people felt a campaign to have been, the more likely they were to vote for the party; 
the more negative they rated it, the less likely they were to support the party.   Furthermore, 
there is some evidence that perceptions of negative campaigning by one party are associated 
with a higher chance of voting for another. The more negative people felt the Conservatives’ 
campaign to have been, the more likely they were to vote Liberal Democrat; the more 
negative the perception of the Labour or Liberal Democrat’s campaigns, the greater the 
chance of voting SNP; and the more negative the SNP campaign was rated, the greater was 
the probability of voting for each of the other three major parties. 
 
Our analyses suggest, therefore, that perceptions of campaign tone influence party choice in 
elections independently of partisanship. An alternative approach in assessing the impact of 
campaign perceptions is to control for initial voting intention rather than partisanship.  Non-
partisans might nonetheless have had a firm voting intention at the start of the campaign and 
that might have altered (as, indeed, might the vote of partisans) as a result of their reactions to 
the campaigns of the various parties.  We repeat the analyses summarised in Table 6, 
therefore, but substituting pre-election vote intention for party identification.  Results are 
reported as before (Table 7 and Table A3).  By controlling for pre-campaign vote intention 
we are in effecting measuring the impact of perceptions of campaign tone in changing 
people’s minds about which party to vote for.  
 
Table 7 about here 
 
There is, of course, considerable inertia in vote choice over the course of the campaign. Most 
of those intending voting for a party at the start of the campaign go on to do so on election 
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day and this is indicated in each equation by a large positive and significant coefficient for 
pre-election intention of voting for the relevant party.  
 
The coefficients for campaign exposure need not detain us since, as before, our main interest 
is in the campaign tone variables. These are similar in direction and significance to those 
found when partisanship was controlled and demonstrate, once again, that negative 
campaigns win few friends while positive campaigns seem to gain support.  Other things 
being equal, the more negative a party’s campaign was perceived to have been, the less likely 
were respondents to switch to that party. Furthermore, there is evidence of negative 
campaigning driving voters to other parties. The more negatively people thought the 
Conservatives had campaigned, the more likely they were to switch to Labour or the Liberal 
Democrats.  Similarly, perceptions of negative Labour campaigning were associated with a 
greater likelihood of switching to the  SNP, negative Liberal Democrat campaigning also 
increased the chance of switching SNP and negative SNP campaigning increased the chances 
that voters would switch to the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats. 
 
We noted above (Table 5) that the perceived tone of the parties’ campaigns affected their 
general likeability and this might explain the impact on vote choice. The final step in our 
analysis, therefore, is to incorporate measures of party likeability into regressions predicting 
vote choice.  This is done in Table 8 (full details in the appendix, Table A4) in which pre-
election party likeability scores and change in likeability over the course of the election are 
added to the analysis reported in Table 7. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
In every case, as we might expect, the more a party was liked before the election and the 
greater the increase in its likeability over the course of the campaign, the more likely 
respondents were to vote for it, after taking account of original voting intention.   Adding the 
likeability measures has a striking effect on the coefficients for campaign tone, however.  
Only in the case of the SNP does evaluation of a party’s campaign tone now significantly 
affect voting for it and, even in that case, the size of the coefficient (Table A4) is much 
smaller than in the previous analysis (Table A3). This strongly suggests that negatively 
perceived campaigning damages parties by making them less likeable in the voter’s eyes. 
Parties which ‘went negative’ lost support by giving voters further reasons to dislike them.  It 
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is also worth noting, however, that even when we control for party likeability, perceptions of 
how one party campaigned can still have an impact on the likelihood of voting for other 
parties. Other things being equal, those who thought Labour campaigned positively became 
less likely to vote SNP, and the more negative people thought the SNP’s campaign, the more 
likely they were to vote Conservative or Labour. 
 
Conclusion 
Election campaigns inevitably combine both negative and positive elements.  From a 
normative perspective, this is not necessarily a problem (Lau and Pomper, 2004).  Negative 
campaigning can involve dirty tricks, unfair claims and character assassination but it can also 
point up real failings and weaknesses.  Drawing attention to these is a legitimate function of 
democratic debate.  Similarly, while positive campaigning may draw attention to future plans 
or past achievements it can also be less than helpful, as when a candidates or parties make 
claims of doubtful validity. Without positive campaign messages, voters may not know what 
they are voting for. Without negative messages, they may not always see rival claims 
thoroughly tested. 
 
Here, however, we have not been concerned with normative aspects but with an empirical 
question – whether negative campaigning ‘works’ in the sense of motivating a party’s 
supporters and putting people off rival parties.  Presumably parties believe that this does 
happen or they would not ‘go negative’.  Campaign advisers argue that although voters may – 
and routinely do – say that they dislike the negative, ‘yah-boo’ aspects of politics, they 
nonetheless respond to negative messages. The evidence presented here, however, suggests 
that in the UK context this initially plausible argument is mistaken.  The more negative a 
party’s campaign is perceived to have been, the less likely people are to vote for the party, the 
more likely those who initially intended voting for it are to abandon it on polling day, and the 
more likely people are to move to its rivals. They do so because emphasising the negative 
makes parties less likeable.  Negative campaigning, in short, produces negative results. 
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Notes 
 
 
1  In elections for the Scottish Parliament a mixed member proportional system (MMP) – 
also known as the additional members system (AMS) – is used. Members are elected via 
one of two different routes: 73 via plurality constituency contests, and 56 via regional list 
contests in eight regions 
2  All analyses employ weights to take into account survey bias. The weights, designed by 
YouGov, are based on age, gender, social class, region, newspaper readership and past 
vote.  
3  Just such a problem occurred during fieldwork for the 1992 British Election Study, for 
instance. Interviewing began immediately after John Major’s Conservatives were re-
elected but was still continuing several months later, after the ERM crisis had abruptly and 
irreversibly destroyed the new government’s public support 
4   The exact question wording was as follows: ‘Campaigning is said to be positive when it 
involves putting forward your own policies and personalities. Negative campaigning 
means criticising the policies and personalities of the other parties. How would you rate 
the campaigns of the following parties (Conservatives; Labour; Liberal Democrats; SNP) 
on a scale from very positive to very negative?’ The options given were: very positive; 
fairly positive; neither positive nor negative; fairly negative; very negative. In all 
following analyses, higher scores on the campaign tone variables indicate more negative 
evaluations of parties’ campaigns. 
5  The quiz consisted of four statements, which respondents were invited to judge true or 
false: “the SNP has promised to hold a referendum on independence if it wins” (true); 
“spending on the NHS in Scotland has gone down since 2003” (false); “after the election 
the new Scottish Executive will have to decide whether to renew the Trident nuclear 
weapon system” (false); and “the Scottish Liberal Democrats are committed to replacing 
the council tax with a local income tax” (true). A quarter of all respondents answered all 
four questions correctly; 29 per cent gave three correct answers; 27 per cent answered two 
correctly; 9 per cent got just one right; and 9 per cent got all four wrong. 
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Table 1: The results of the 2007 Scottish Parliament election 
 
 Constituencies Regional list Total Seats 
  Votes  Seats Votes Seats N % 
 %  %    
Conservative 16.6 4 13.9 13 17 13.2 
Labour 32.2 37 29.2 9 46 35.7 
Lib Dem 16.2 11 11.3 5 16 12.4 
SNP 32.9 21 31.0 26 47 36.4 
Other 2.1 0 14.6 3 3 2.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Perceptions of campaign tone at the 2007 Scottish Parliament election 
 
  Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
 % % % % 
Very positive 6 3 5 22 
Fairly positive 30 17 30 29 
Neither positive nor negative 30 21 41 20 
Fairly negative 23 25 18 15 
Very negative 11 34 7 14 
 
(N) (1214) (1271) (1216) (1261)  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations between assessments of campaign tone 
 
 Conservative Labour Lib Dem   
Labour -0.018 - 
Lib Dem 0.234 0.285 - 
SNP 0.159 -0.151 0.219 
    
Note: The number of cases involved ranges from 1189 (Con-Lib Dem) to 1214 (Lib Dem – 
SNP).  Coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.01). 
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Table 4: Accounting for assessments of campaign tone: OLS regressions 
 
Campaign tone: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
 
Highest education qualification (comparison = none) 
Degree - N -  - 
Vocational - N - - 
School - N - - 
Other - - - - 
Age group (comparison = 18-24) 
25-34 - P - - 
34-44 - P - - 
45-54 N P - - 
55-64 N P - - 
65+ - P - - 
Class (comparison = salariat) 
Non-manual - - - - 
Petty bourgeoisie - N - - 
Foremen - N - - 
Working class - - - - 
Other - - - - 
Party identification (comparison = none) 
Conservative - P - - 
Labour N - - - 
Lib Dem - - P P 
SNP - N - P 
Other - - - - 
 
Political knowledge P N P - 
 
Exposure to party campaign P - P   P 
 
Pre-election party likeability P P P P 
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Table 5: The impact of perceived campaign tone on liking/disliking parties: OLS regressions 
 
  Post-election like/dislike score 
 Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
Pre-election  
like/dislike score: 0.75 0.78 0.62 0.69 
 
Campaign negativity score  
Conservative -0.52 0.12 0.21 0.25 
Labour 0.12 -0.28 0.05 0.15 
Lib Dem -0.04 -0.07 -0.54 0.08 
SNP 0.14 0.04 0.16 -0.70 
Constant 2.23 2.19 2.71 2.27 
 
R2 0.77 0.78 0.61 0.79 
 
N 1147 1152 1147 1147 
 
 
Note: coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.01).  For the campaign tone 
measures a positive coefficient implies a more negative evaluation of the campaign and vice 
versa. 
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 Table 6: Campaign tone and regional vote choice, 2007: Binary logit regression 
 
Regional vote: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
Party identification (comparison = none) 
 Conservative P N - N 
 Labour - P N N 
  Lib Dem - N P - 
 SNP N N N P 
 Other - - - N 
Exposure to party campaigns 
 Conservative P - - - 
 Labour - - - - 
  Lib Dem - P - - 
 SNP - N - P 
Campaign tone  
 Conservative P - N - 
 Labour - P - N 
  Lib Dem - - P N 
 SNP N N N P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Campaign tone and changing regional vote choice, 2007: Binary logit regression 
 
Regional vote: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
Pre-election regional vote intention (comparison = abstain/other party/not sure) 
 Conservative P N N - 
 Labour N P N N 
  Lib Dem - - P - 
 SNP N N N P 
Exposure to party campaigns 
 Conservative - - - - 
 Labour - P - - 
  Lib Dem - P - - 
 SNP - - N - 
Campaign tone 
 Conservative P N N - 
 Labour - P - N 
  Lib Dem - - P N 
 SNP N N N P 
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 Table 8: Likeability, campaign tone and the regional vote, 2007: Binary logit regression 
 
Regional vote: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
  
Pre-election regional vote intention (comparison = abstain/other party/not sure) 
 Conservative P - - - 
 Labour N P N - 
  Lib Dem - - P - 
 SNP N N N P 
Exposure to party campaigns 
 Conservative - - - - 
 Labour - - - - 
  Lib Dem - P - - 
 SNP - - - - 
Campaign tone  
 Conservative - - - P 
 Labour - - - N 
  Lib Dem - - - N 
 SNP N N - P 
Pre-election party likeability scores 
  P P P P 
Change in party likeability scores 
  P P P P 
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Appendix: 
 
 
Table A1: Accounting for assessments of campaign tone: OLS regressions 
 
Campaign tone: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
 
Highest education qualification (comparison = no formal qualifications) 
Degree --0.12 0.23 -0.02 -0.09 
Vocational -0.08 0.24 -0.01 -0.14 
School 0.01 0.24 0.04 -0.02 
Other 0.30 0.21 0.12 -0.14 
Age group (comparison = 18-24) 
25-34 0.15 -0.28 -0.04 -0.11 
34-44 0.10 -0.36 0.04 -0.03 
45-54 0.25 -0.35 0.11 0.06 
55-64 0.31 -0.24 0.16 0.12 
65+ 0.08 -0.38 0.04 0.01 
Class (comparison = salariat) 
Non-manual -0.02 -0.04 -0.14 0.01 
Petty bourgeoisie 0.05 0.33 0.04 -0.08 
Foremen -0.02 0.39 0.17 0.03 
Working class 0.09 0.05 0.06 -0.15 
Other -0.05 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 
Party identification (comparison = no party ID) 
Conservative -0.21 -0.22 -0.14 -0.19 
Labour 0.19 -0.12 -0.09 0.01 
Lib Dem 0.09 -0.01 -0.24 -0.33 
SNP -0.09 0.26 -0.11 -0.28 
Other 0.14 0.17 -0.17 0.01 
 
Political knowledge -0.12 0.17 -0.05 -0.05 
 
Exposure to party campaign 
 -0.17 -0.04 -0.09   -0.16 
Pre-election party likeability 
 -0.14 -0.16   -0.15 -0.21 
 
Constant 3.93 4.22 4.07 4.51 
 
R2 0.26 0.30 0.22 0.39 
N 1186 1243 1187 1223 
 
Note: coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05).  In all cases, a positive 
coefficient implies a more negative evaluation of the campaign and vice versa. 
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Table A2: Campaign tone and regional vote choice, 2007: Binary logit regression 
 
Regional vote: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
Party identification (comparison = none) 
 Conservative 2.17 -1.22 -1.00 -1.10 
 Labour -0.77 1.95 -1.12 -1.24 
  Lib Dem -0.58 -2.45 1.95 -0.48 
 SNP -2.03 -1.52 -2.26 1.71 
 Other -0.37 -0.52 -19.33 -1.11 
Exposure to party campaigns 
 Conservative 0.49 -0.33 -0.35 0.11 
 Labour -0.16 0.18 0.21 -0.06 
  Lib Dem -0.15 0.90 0.00 -0.07 
 SNP -0.23 -0.39 -0.17 0.35 
Campaign tone  
 Conservative -0.73 0.13 0.43 0.05 
 Labour 0.06 -0.49 -0.08 0.26 
  Lib Dem 0.25 0.02 -0.89 0.27 
 SNP 0.32 0.43 0.30 -0.92 
Constant -2.58 -3.10 -4.97 -1.45 
 
-2 log likelihood 772.46 1110.96 755.21 1441.85 
Model improvement 313.44 433.46 266.85 633.31 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nagelkerke R2 0.49 0.51 0.43 0.59 
% correctly classified 91.6 86.4 91.8 0.85 
N 1169 1169 1169 1168 
 
Note: coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05).  For the campaign tone 
measures a positive coefficient implies a more negative evaluation of the campaign and vice 
versa. 
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Table A3: Campaign tone and changing regional vote choice, 2007: Binary logit regression 
 
Regional vote: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
Pre-election regional vote intention (comparison = abstain/other party/not sure) 
 Conservative 2.58 -2.67 -1.81 -0.57 
 Labour -3.59 2.39 -1.08 -1.33 
  Lib Dem -2.72 -0.82 2.63 -0.55 
 SNP -2.96 -2.34 -2.38 2.57 
Exposure to party campaigns 
 Conservative 0.38 -0.24 -0.09 -0.12 
 Labour -0.21 0.34 -0.02 0.01 
  Lib Dem -0.18 0.57 0.10 0.23 
 SNP -0.11 -0.18 -0.46 0.21 
Campaign tone  
 Conservative -0.78 0.24 0.29 0.01 
 Labour 0.08 -0.46 -0.07 0.27 
  Lib Dem 0.08 0.17 -0.81 0.26 
 SNP 0.39 0.30 0.27 -0.91 
Constant -2.99 -3.81 -1.47 -1.44 
 
-2 log likelihood 772.78 1111.55 755.51 1445.31 
Model improvement 360.71 459.89 271.41 686.07 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nagelkerke R2 0.55 0.53 0.44 0.63 
% correctly classified 93.2 88.3 92.8 87.3 
N 1170 1169 1169 1170 
 
Note: coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05).  For the campaign tone 
measures a positive coefficient implies a more negative evaluation of the campaign and vice 
versa. 
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Table A4: Likeability, campaign tone and the regional vote, 2007: Binary logit regression 
 
Regional vote: Conservative Labour Lib Dem SNP 
  
Pre-election regional vote intention (comparison = abstain/other party/not sure) 
 Conservative 1.58 -2.01 -1.37 -0.03 
 Labour -3.05 1.45 -1.26 0.76 
  Lib Dem -2.49 -0.65 1.85 0.06 
 SNP -2.72 -1.96 -2.06 1.77 
Exposure to party campaigns 
 Conservative 0.32 -0.13 -0.13 0.03 
 Labour 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.07 
  Lib Dem -0.38 0.67 -0.10 0.27 
 SNP --0.20 0.29 -0.34 -0.08 
Campaign tone  
 Conservative -0.28 0.07 0.10 -0.24 
 Labour -0.04 -0.13 -0.14 0.25 
  Lib Dem 0.07 0.22 -0.18 0.23 
 SNP 0.27 0.37 0.18 -0.34 
Pre-election party likeability scores 
  0.46 0.49 0.71 0.51 
Change in party likeability scores 
  0.36 0.37 0.59 0.45 
Constant -6.22 -7.87 -7.08 -5.69 
 
-2 log likelihood 764.89 1085.34 745.31 1401.51 
Model improvement 409.74 539.03 343.15 788.10 
Significance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Nagelkerke R2 0.62 0.61 0.54 0.71 
% correctly classified 93.1 88.9 93.2 88.6 
N  1135 1138 1134 1133 
 
Note: coefficients in bold are statistically significant (p < 0.05).  For the campaign tone 
measures a positive coefficient implies a more negative evaluation of the campaign and vice 
versa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
